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Introduction 
Health reform legislation has offered 
the promise of dramatically altering 
the way providers are paid, shifting 
from paying for volume to paying for 
value. Viewed by many as potentially 
transformative, it is one of the few 
policy approaches that achieved 
support across the political spectrum. 
President Obama frequently 
emphasized the shift in payment 
methods that health reform would 
accomplish.
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 Bill Frist, a physician 
and former Republican Senate 
majority leader, emphasized the 
change, ―The most powerful way to 
reduce costs (and make room to 
expand coverage) is to shift away 
from ‗volume-based‘ reimbursement 
(the more you do, the more money 
you make) to ‗value-based‘ 
reimbursement.‖2 After passage of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (The Affordable Care Act), 
the immediate media explanation of 
its significance placed particular 
emphasis on this payment alteration. 
Dr. Tim Johnson explained the change 
on ABC News, ―Doctors and hospitals 
will have to be paid differently. Not 
simply for procedures—the more they 
do the more they make—but for 
outcomes.‖3 
The problems created by volume-
based payment, as epitomized by the 
fee-for-service approach to paying 
physicians for each individual service 
provided, have become increasingly 
recognized. U.S. health care quality is 
often mediocre, yet provided at an 
enormous cost. Mediocre quality of 
care suffers no sanctions; indeed, 
reimbursement on the basis of the 
number of services generated may 
actually reward substandard quality, 
since reimbursable services that do 
not benefit patients are directly 
rewarded. These two facts, a general 
tolerance of uneven and mediocre 
quality capturing an enormous and 
growing national commitment in 
resources, prompt a search for the 
causes and solutions to this health 
care dysfunction. Why doesn‘t health 
care deliver sustainable cost-effective, 
high-quality care—or in other words, 
high-value care? 
This interest in achieving higher-value 
care has led to efforts to improve the 
measurement of care, to use the 
measures for quality improvement, to 
engage purchasers and consumers 
with the new information, and, 
potentially, to adopt payment 
approaches that support improved 
quality and greater cost-effectiveness, 
as indicated by measurement. 
Proponents of greater reliance on 
measurement in payment believe that 
such an approach would support 
higher value rather than 
indiscriminate volume.  
Accordingly, there are broad-based 
calls for what has variously been 
labeled ―value-based,‖ ―results-
based,‖ ―performance-based,‖ or 
―outcomes-based‖ payment. These 
different terms have slightly different 
implications but all convey the similar 
notion that clinicians and other 
providers would receive payment 
based primarily on assessing the 
benefits to patients and society of the 
health care they produce, rather than 
on the effort and accompanying 
resources used in producing the care.  
Given the hope associated with what 
is being presented as fundamental 
change, it is important (and perhaps 
disconcerting) to point out that the 
payment approaches specifically 
identified in the Affordable Care Act 
for pilot testing—including bundled 
episodes, shared savings and partial 
capitation to accountable care 
organizations and other provider 
entities, and further development of 
payment options for patient-centered 
medical homes—do not actually 
produce a complete shift from 
volume-based to value-based 
payments. Rather, some of the new, 
promising approaches remain 
grounded firmly in fee-for-service 
payment, but provide certain new 
incentives to alter the content of care. 
Other approaches represent a more 
fundamental shift away from fee-for-
service, but do not currently work by 
providing payments based on assessed 
value using performance 
measurement. Rather, they primarily 
are designed to alter the payment 
incentives physicians and other 
providers respond to, with the goal of 
improving value, whether or not the 
value can be recognized and rewarded 
in real time. 
In short, although there is broad 
policy consensus that current volume-
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based payment approaches need to be 
replaced with alternatives that achieve 
higher value for the considerable 
financial investment made, there is 
some disagreement on how much the 
new approaches require the active 
adoption and implementation of 
performance measurement as the basis 
for payment, rather than changing the 
fundamental incentives that payment 
approaches provide. In the former 
approach, value would be measured 
and rewarded directly; in the latter 
approach, value would be rewarded 
indirectly by providing incentives for 
the provision of care thought to be 
more likely to produce higher value.  
The goal of this paper is to explore 
what is meant by value-based 
payment, emphasizing different views 
on the role of performance 
measurement in supporting the 
concept and to identify approaches to 
overcoming the current obstacles to 
recognizing and rewarding higher-
value care.  
After considering different concepts 
of value-based payment, the paper 
explains how the two different 
concepts—one emphasizing 
performance measurement of value 
and the other emphasizing changing 
payment incentives for providers—
can produce different payment 
approaches. Next, the paper reviews 
provisions of the Affordable Care Act 
that call for explicit value-based 
payment through the use of specific 
performance measures. The paper 
then provides a brief snapshot of the 
state of measurement of quality and 
costs, and points to the difficulties of 
using measures to produce a ―value 
index‖ of providers or geographic 
areas. The paper concludes by 
exploring strengths and weaknesses in 
some payment models related to the 
objective of producing higher-value 
health care, and suggests a different 
role for performance measurement—
as a complement to protect against 
adverse responses to altered payment 
incentives.  
Different Views on the Use 
of Quality Measures in 
Payment 
Proponents of Reliance on Measures  
Some policymakers are optimistic that 
even with the use of traditional 
payment methods, an explicit 
consideration of quality and cost of 
care can produce higher-value care 
than simply paying for services 
rendered. The new attitude toward 
payment, as Mark McClellan, former 
administrator of the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, put 
it, is, ―You get what you pay for. And 
we ought to be paying for better 
quality.‖4 The hope is that the new 
payment approaches would directly 
reward society‘s desired performance, 
as described in the six aims of quality 
set forth by the Institute of Medicine 
in Crossing the Quality Chasm—
namely, care that is ―safe, effective, 
efficient, patient-centered, equitable, 
and timely.‖5 For these policy 
analysts, moving from current 
volume-based payment approaches to 
value- or outcome-based payment is 
the literal goal; where measures of 
value do not exist, there would be an 
imperative to develop and implement 
them. A common mantra for many has 
become, ―you can‘t manage what you 
don‘t measure.‖  
Skeptics of Using Current 
Measurement Sets  
Others are skeptical that we have 
valid measures for much of what 
people would consider the core 
elements of the care provided by 
health professionals and institutions. 
Further, some doubt we can readily 
overcome the many logistical 
obstacles to permit valid and reliable 
assessments using available measures 
of the value of care provided. These 
policy analysts are more apt to quote 
Albert Einstein, ―Everything that can 
be counted does not necessarily count; 
everything that counts cannot 
necessarily be counted.‖  
There is important agreement among 
the different groups. They agree that 
current volume-based reimbursement 
approaches need to be replaced 
promptly. Further, those who rely 
heavily on measurement of value 
typically acknowledge large gaps in 
current measurement sets and want to 
alter payment incentives as a 
necessary complement to the essential 
and overriding commitment to 
measuring performance. For their 
part, critics of heavy reliance on 
measures to reward performance often 
do recommend using measures as an 
adjunct to altering basic payment 
incentives—but only when there are 
valid and relevant measures that can 
be applied opportunistically to support 
the use of altered incentives. They 
often recommend this use of available 
measures to detect untoward behavior 
produced by too-strong provider 
response to the altered incentives.  
Although all can agree to endorse the 
desire for new and better measures, 
nevertheless, the different views on 
the role of measuring performance in 
trying to attain higher-value health 
care create tension that has not been 
generally acknowledged. They can 
produce different payment reform 
options and different operational 
approaches to accomplishing payment 
change to produce higher value. 
Measuring Value 
As noted, some payment experts 
consider the goal of payment reform 
to be to literally and directly reward 
―value,‖ which in health policy
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discussions commonly refers to some 
assessment of the quality of care 
provided (the numerator) divided by 
some measure of costs to provide the 
service(s). Although this formulation 
that value = quality / costs is 
commonly used as health policy 
shorthand, current attempts to assign 
the ―value‖ of the health services 
delivered by a practice, provider 
organization, or geographic area lack 
quantitative precision. Quality is 
commonly measured using many 
different scales, such as the 
percentage compliant with a standard 
or the mortality rate for a condition. 
Costs are measured usually simply as 
dollars spent, but sometimes the cost 
factor in determining ―value‖ can also 
represent the rate of increase in costs, 
not the absolute costs. 
Using these different measurement 
scales, there is no standard 
mathematical basis for deciding how 
to measure how much ―value‖ is 
altered with a change in either the 
numerator or denominator. So, for 
example, if an intervention is shown 
to increase measured quality at a 
higher measured cost, we don‘t know 
whether the intervention has increased 
or decreased value. For assessing 
value, policymakers have not 
achieved the kind of agreement found 
in cost-effectiveness analysis, which 
typically standardizes effectiveness 
into quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYS), which then can be used in 
relation to costs to determine cost 
effectiveness of an intervention.
6 
But 
the approach of converting measures 
of effectiveness into a common metric 
to determine QALYS is not without 
controversy; for example, related 
issues of equity and fairness come up 
in deciding how to adjust for age in 
discounting an expected health benefit  
 
 
over time. Attempting to convert 
different quality measures into a 
common metric to permit quantitative 
assessment as part of a value equation 
would be difficult and controversial. 
Yet, without conversion to a common 
metric, our ability to make a global 
assessment of value will be elusive.  
As a policy goal, then, there is 
consensus on the desirability of using 
payment policies to achieve higher 
value for the dollars spent for health 
services, whether by improving 
quality or reducing costs, as an 
alternative to simply paying for 
services rendered regardless of how 
well or efficiently they are provided. 
The casual use of value has become 
common as a qualitative aspiration to 
indicate that those footing the bill for 
health services can get ―more bang for 
the buck.‖ That aspiration, however, 
is grounded in the real and urgent 
concerns about the fragmentation and 
operational dysfunction that result in 
mediocre quality at huge national 
expense—essentially the lack of a 
―value‖ proposition in the delivery of 
health care.  
The concept of value has entered the 
health policy lexicon and is in 
common use. Yet, experts do not 
agree on how formally or 
quantitatively assessments of value  
 
 
 
can be made, and as discussed above, 
whether performance measurement 
needs to be an essential component of 
altered payment methods.  
The Use of Measures for 
Accountable Care 
Organizations 
For example, for some, the appeal of 
what has been labeled accountable 
care organizations (ACOs) lies with 
the belief that we can now measure 
performance well enough to make 
assessments of whether organizations 
have achieved desired thresholds of 
performance to ensure sufficient 
accountability of quality and costs. In 
theory, if an assessment of 
performance becomes a direct 
component of their financial success, 
providers—in this case, accountable 
care organizations—will shift their 
attention and resources toward 
achieving value on the measures being 
applied. A recent definition of 
accountable care organizations by 
some of the concept‘s main 
proponents, Mark McClellan and 
Elliot Fisher, puts performance 
measurement at the forefront as an 
intrinsic part of the ACO concept.
7
 
They acknowledge current limitations 
in available measures by calling for 
implementation of ACOs with a 
―starter set‖ of measures of quality, 
efficiency, and patient experience, 
before making the transition to 
advanced measures that emphasize 
health outcomes, functional status, 
VALUE= 
    QUALITY 
(e.g., % compliance with a standard,  
    or mortality rate for a condition) 
 
COSTS 
(e.g., absolute dollars spent, 
 or the rate of increase in costs) 
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and reductions in health risks. But 
they seem confident that needed, 
additional measures will be 
forthcoming.  
Others focus much more on changing 
payment incentives to organizations 
able to provide care across a range of 
health care services that patients need, 
and expect higher value to be 
produced whether or not their higher 
value can be measured in real time. 
They would use measures more 
strategically, seeing their use often as 
complementary to changing payment 
incentives, by measuring aspects of 
care that might get short shrift under 
the new payment approach under 
consideration, to provide public 
confidence that lower cost can be 
achieved with better care.
8
 For 
example, such measures might 
provide important information and 
influence behavior to moderate 
providers‘ responses to capitation 
incentives—that is, the payment up 
front of a fixed amount per capita 
regardless of the volume of services 
provided. Healthcare Effectiveness 
Data and Information Set (HEDIS)
9 
measures, which focus on primary and 
secondary prevention activities, can 
be used to counter the concern that 
providers receiving per capita 
payments for populations under their 
care might skimp on these preventive 
services.
10
  
Under this view, measures primarily 
advance a strategic purpose—namely, 
to help protect against behavior that 
new payment models might 
unintentionally promote. But even 
here, limitations on available 
measures urge caution in how the new 
payment approaches should be 
implemented and suggest the need for 
process protections for patients, such 
as appeals and grievance procedures, 
in addition to the use of measurement 
to assess performance. For these 
experts, then, measuring particular 
aspects of performance represents a 
relatively small component of 
adopting new payment approaches—it 
is not unimportant, but not nearly as 
central as putting the new incentives 
in place.  
Measuring Value Versus 
Changing Incentives 
As articulated in a recent commentary 
by John Rother, a veteran of payment 
policy discussions, changing the 
incentives to providers through 
payment policy is a critical step 
toward realizing our goals for 
excellent health care performance.
11
 
The focus here on change in payment 
approaches is to alter incentives—not 
to specifically reward value. 
Similarly, the goal of one of the new 
payment approaches, episode-based 
payments, is to create financial 
incentives for providers to improve 
efficiency and coordination of care.
12
 
That can occur without measurement 
of efficiency or coordination.  
Another expert, Harold Miller, has 
argued that new payment models do 
represent a shift from volume- to 
value-based payments because of their 
emphasis on the need for providers to 
consider costs, by giving providers 
greater responsibility for the factors 
that drive costs.
13 
The new payment 
approaches like episode-based 
payments change the incentives that 
providers respond to; they do not 
intrinsically rely on the assessment of 
performance in meeting quality or 
cost objectives in making payments, 
most simply because there is a lack of 
meaningful, actionable performance 
measures.
14
 
The Network for Regional Healthcare 
Improvement‘s Payment Reform 
Summit, convened by Miller to try to 
achieve a consensus among policy 
experts and practitioners on desirable 
payment reform, listed key elements 
of better health care payment systems. 
One element is that new approaches 
should pay for services with a 
demonstrated relationship to desired 
outcomes, and give providers payment 
bonuses and/or penalties based on the 
outcomes they achieve for their 
patients, the satisfaction of their 
patients, and the patients‘ utilization 
of other health care services.
15
 Note 
that in this principle, measurement 
and pay-for-performance remain 
components of the new payment 
policy, but are not dominant. The core 
concept is encouraging services with a 
known relationship to outcomes, 
whether or not the outcomes can be 
measured in real time. Here, the 
bonuses and penalties might be 
viewed as complementary to the basic 
payment incentives. 
Other payment policy experts, on the 
other hand, consider measuring 
performance to be an essential and 
intrinsic component of improved 
payment models and call for a more 
literal application of the concept of 
value-based payments. For example, 
Bob Galvin argues that reformed 
payment approaches require that the 
performance-based payments must be 
large enough to make it worthwhile 
for providers to participate, with the 
size of rewards for measurably better 
performance being able to cover at 
least the cost of improvement, thereby 
likely exceeding the income that 
simply providing more services would 
generate.
16
  
For Galvin, a main problem with 
current application of pay-for-
performance enhancements of 
standard payment is that not enough 
reimbursement has been based on 
measured performance, and so the 
approach has had limited impact. He 
looks to the United Kingdom, which 
provided as much as 25 percent of a 
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general practitioner‘s income based 
on his or her performance in meeting 
targets on a range of incentive 
payments focused on the delivery of 
specified care, mostly in primary and 
secondary prevention.
17 
A clear result 
of the U.K. program was that National 
Health Service physicians devoted a 
lot of effort to achieving the needed 
performance, and a lot extra was paid 
out to them. What is not clear is 
whether the investment—a prototype 
for some of today‘s value-based 
payment efforts—was worth the 
investment.
18
 That is, did it achieve 
higher value?  
Different Concepts of 
Value-Based Payment 
Produce Different Payment 
Approaches 
The differences in approaches 
between reliance on real-time 
performance measurement and 
embedding altered incentives in basic 
payment can be illustrated by different 
approaches for reducing avoidable 
hospital readmissions.
19
  
Approach 1: Emphasizing 
Performance Measurement  
The Affordable Care Act in Section 
3025 has adopted what is basically a 
pay-for-performance approach based 
on measurement of readmission rates 
for particular diagnoses. Under this 
approach, every hospital‘s rate of 
avoidable readmissions – that is, 
diagnoses whose rates of readmission 
reliably vary based on the quality of 
hospital discharge procedures and 
post-hospital follow-up activities – 
would be measured and publicly 
reported for a subset of conditions 
(initially, acute myocardial infarction, 
pneumonia, and congestive heart 
failure). Some hospitals—perhaps 
those with the highest 20 percent of 
readmission rates—would be subject 
to financial penalties. The basic 
payments that all hospitals receive for 
discharges would not be altered, 
whether or not particular readmissions 
were avoidable. Rather, ―value-based 
payments,‖ in this case, penalties, 
would be focused on outliers, 
determined through performance 
measurement.  
Approach 2: Altering Provider 
Incentives 
An alternative approach would not 
rely on measuring readmission rates 
but would change the inherent 
payment incentives related to 
readmissions for all hospitals. In what 
has been called a ―warranty‖ payment 
approach, with the implied promise of 
a successful initial hospitalization that 
in essence warrants that a readmission 
within a specified time would not be 
needed, there would be no (or, more 
likely, reduced) additional payment 
for readmissions for a subset of 
conditions within a specified time. 
The base payments for these 
conditions might be increased to make 
up for the reduced payment for 
readmissions. As an example of this 
approach, currently, in the Medicare 
in-patient, psychiatric hospital 
prospective payment system, no new 
payments are made for readmissions 
within the first 72 hours of 
discharge.
20
 
In a somewhat gentler approach to 
altering provider incentives, the basic 
payment system could alter the 
payment for a preventable 
readmission to an estimate of the 
variable cost to the hospital of the 
readmission, perhaps 60 percent of a 
full payment amount.
21
 If applied in 
Medicare, the financial penalty would 
be embedded in the base payment 
amount, plausibly providing a direct 
incentive for all hospitals to try to 
reduce readmissions for this subset of 
hospital discharges, whether or not 
they are likely to be in the outlier 
group subject to financial penalties 
based on their measured performance. 
There might still be an important role 
for measurement to complement the 
altered, embedded incentives. For 
example, measurement of readmission 
rates might provide helpful public 
information to influence consumer 
choice of hospitals or to target 
egregious performance for remedial 
intervention. But for this discussion, 
the key point is that measurement can 
be complementary to a basic change 
in payment policy that relies on 
embedding altered incentives into 
payment, without the requirement to 
measure actual performance. 
In various ways, altering incentives in 
basic payment is easier to administer, 
and it should have more immediate 
impact on provider behavior. Yet, it is 
a cruder approach and, as discussed 
below, runs the risk that the new 
incentives will be too strong and lack 
needed measurement to detect 
undesirable problems caused by 
overreaction to the new incentives.  
In distinguishing between the two 
approaches described here, it is 
important to remember that Medicare 
adoption of a range of prospective 
payment systems for different 
provider types has not depended upon 
real-time measurement. When the 
inpatient prospective payment system 
based on payment for diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs) was 
implemented in the mid-1980s, there 
was concern hospitals to discharge 
patients ―quicker and sicker,‖ as the 
powerful new incentives of a fixed 
payment might cause hospitals to 
prematurely discharge patients.
22 
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However, adoption of the approach 
did not await the ability to measure in 
real time each hospital‘s rate of 
quicker and sicker discharges. Indeed, 
such measurement would still be 
difficult to accomplish today.  
Rather, research studies have looked 
at the issue and concluded that the 
altered incentives did not lead 
Medicare patients to receive fewer 
appropriate tests and procedures, 
although there was evidence that 
patients were somewhat more likely to 
be discharged to their homes in a 
more unstable condition.
23 
The point 
here is that supporting research 
evaluating the impact of the new  
 
payment system using a sample of 
hospitals is not the same as requiring 
actual measurement of premature 
discharges in real time from all 
hospitals.  
Value-Related Provisions 
in the Affordable Care Act 
The Affordable Care Act includes 
something for all sides of the value-
based payment debate. For proponents 
of measurement-drive payment 
models, the Act includes the 
following provision: 
 Section 3022 calls for a Medicare 
Shared Savings Program, which 
would provide payments  
 
specifically for new accountable 
care organizations. The legislation 
specifically requires measurement 
and assessment of quality as 
reflected in clinical processes and 
outcomes, patient and caregiver 
experience with care, and 
utilization reflecting efficiency 
and effectiveness of care, such as 
hospital admissions for 
ambulatory care sensitive 
conditions.  
The Act introduced the concept of 
value-based payments in other ways 
as well. The health reform debate 
involved extensive and sometimes 
contentious debate about creating 
―value indexes‖ for geographic areas, 
Payment System Comparison: 
Reducing Medicare Hospital Readmissions 
Using Two Different Value-Based Payment Approaches 
 
Approach 1: 
Emphasizing Performance Measurement 
 
Approach 2: 
Altering Provider Incentives 
 
Paying (or Penalizing) Outliers for their Performance  
The Affordable Care Act‘s Section 3025 adopts what is 
basically a pay-for-performance approach rooted in 
measurement of readmission rates for particular diagnoses. 
Under this approach, every hospital‘s rate of avoidable 
readmissions (that is, diagnoses whose rates of 
readmission vary reliably based on the quality of hospital 
discharge procedures and post-hospital follow-up 
activities), would be measured and publicly reported for a 
subset of conditions. Some hospitals—perhaps those with 
the highest 20 percent of readmission rates—would be 
subject to financial penalties. The basic payments that all 
hospitals receive for discharges would not be altered, 
whether or not particular readmissions were avoidable; 
rather, ―value-based payments‖ (in this case, penalties) 
would be focused on outliers, determined through 
performance measurement.  
 
A Warranty Approach for All Hospitals 
Currently, in the Medicare in-patient, psychiatric hospital 
prospective payment system, no new payments are made for 
readmissions within the first 72 hours of discharge. This has 
been called a ―warranty‖ payment approach, since a 
successful initial hospitalization in essence warrants that a 
readmission within a specified time period would not be 
needed. Under this approach, there is either no or more 
likely reduced additional payment for readmissions for the 
subset of conditions within a specified period of time, but 
the base payments for these conditions might be increased. 
This approach does not rely on measuring readmission rates, 
but changes the inherent payment incentives related to 
readmissions for all hospitals. Publishing measured 
readmission rates might be desirable, but complementary to 
the payment change. 
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hospitals, and physicians, again based 
on the view that quality and cost could 
be reliably and validly measured and 
used for making differential payments 
to recognize and promote improved 
performance. As discussed below, the 
House of Representatives had the 
more extensive debate on the issue, 
with some members proposing that 
provider payments be altered to pay 
more for care in apparently more 
efficient rural and northern regions‘ 
counties, while reducing payment 
updates for less efficient urban and 
southern regions.
24
 
Given the contentious nature of the 
debate, the House compromise was to 
ask the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to 
study the value issue in two ways. 
First, the IOM would conduct a study 
that would explore whether 
Medicare‘s current geographic 
payment adjustments for the prices 
paid to physicians and hospitals, 
which are designed to reflect 
differences in input prices, are 
accurate and to propose specific 
improvements, if any. Second, and 
broader in scope, the IOM would 
conduct a companion study on 
geographic variations in the volume 
and intensity of services and 
recommend how to incorporate 
―quality and value‖ metrics into 
Medicare payment systems.  
Because much of the House health 
reform bill‘s language was lost when 
Congress decided to use the Senate 
bill as the basis for final legislation, 
permitting only a few House 
amendments to be brought as part of 
reconciliation bill amendments, the 
House compromise was not included 
in the Affordable Care Act. 
Subsequently, the secretary of the 
Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), Kathleen Sebelius, 
committed in writing to congressional 
members of the Quality Care 
Coalition (members representing 
lower-spending districts) that she 
would commission the IOM study as 
called for by the House.
25 
Recently, 
the IOM announced formation of the 
study panel, which has already begun 
meeting.
26
  
The Affordable Care Act includes a 
Senate provision that would pay for 
individual physician services based on 
a ―value index‖ assigned to physicians 
according to their quality and costs:  
 Section 3007 creates a new 
―value-based payment modifier,‖ 
which, starting in 2015, will be 
used to provide differential 
payments based on quality and 
cost of care. Since the payment 
adjustments are to be budget 
neutral, some physicians would 
receive bonuses and others 
penalties under this provision. 
Presumably, the IOM‘s study will 
be influential in determining how 
CMS might apply a value-based 
payment modifier. 
Further, the Act continues to advance 
the notion of bringing value into 
payments made to physicians, 
hospitals, and other providers through 
established payment mechanisms:  
 Section 3013 provides for the 
identification of gaps in quality 
measures and authorizes (but does 
not appropriate) funding intended 
to fill those gaps, relying on 
collaboration between CMS, the 
Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) and the 
National Quality Forum, which 
will be primarily responsible for 
identifying the measure gaps. 
Priorities are to be given to the 
following areas: 
 health outcomes; 
 functional status; 
 coordination of care; 
 ―meaningful use‖ of health 
IT; 
 safety; 
 patient experience; 
 efficiency; and 
 disparities. 
 
While this work proceeds, the current 
pay-for-reporting and pay-for-
performance programs—labeled as 
value-based purchasing—for 
physicians and hospitals will be 
extended and expanded. The most 
advanced is the program for hospitals; 
FY 2013 measures will include 
measures for five conditions and 
patient experience as measured by the 
Hospital Consumer Assessment of 
Healthcare Providers and Systems 
Survey (HCAHPS). FY 2014 will 
include measures of efficiency. 
While not usually presented as part of 
value-based payment initiatives, in 
fact, for those who think that positive 
change will derive primarily from 
changes in payment incentives and the 
organizational changes that should 
follow, there are important provisions 
as well, the most important being the 
following:  
 Section 3021 creates a Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation within the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services 
to test payment and service 
delivery models that reduce costs 
while preserving or enhancing the 
quality of care provided under 
Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP, 
and funds it at $10 billion every 
10 years. The legislation 
specifically suggests pursuing 
models that transition providers 
away from fee-for-service and 
toward comprehensive payment, 
among other approaches. 
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Concerns with the State of 
Performance Measurement 
The current policy interest in using 
measurement to evaluate performance 
and, ultimately, the value of services 
rendered has its roots in recent efforts 
to require providers to report quality-
related metrics and, in some cases, to 
tie marginal payments to performance. 
The latter is called pay-for-
performance. More recently, measures 
of ―efficiency,‖ as captured by 
utilization and cost information, and 
measures of patient experience with 
care have been added as well. Clearly, 
the pay-for-performance approach—
although it is controversial and its 
success in positively altering provider 
behavior is unproven
27—has become 
the basis for suggestions of even 
broader adoption of value-based 
payment, with the payments extending 
beyond a marginal, few percent add-
ons or deductions and instead 
involving a major portion of 
providers‘ reimbursement, much as 
the U.K. has done.
28
  
The logic of pay-for-performance 
seems compelling to many, and its 
rapid expansion was considered 
inevitable. In the words of a 2006 
New England Journal of Medicine 
editorial, ―pay-for-performance, will, 
in effect, merge financial incentives 
with a tremendous expansion in public 
profiling [against a broad array of 
quality measures].‖29 At the height of 
interest in pay-for-performance a few 
years ago, the rationale for developing 
and using more measures was taken 
for granted by many. Payment based 
on measures, some argued, should 
represent a substantial portion of the 
reimbursement income of a 
physician‘s practice, with an 
acknowledgment that perhaps 
measures should be rotated annually 
so as not to overwhelm the practice 
with too many measures at one time.
30
  
There were and remain many practical 
issues about how to implement a pay-
for-performance approach to provide 
incentives for improved provider 
behavior, which remain beyond the 
scope of this issue brief.
31
 
Nevertheless, many of these problems 
would be even more relevant if value-
based payments were made a larger 
portion of a clinician‘s or 
organization‘s reimbursement 
package. Whatever the practical 
challenges, experts disagree over the 
likelihood that the measures needed, 
in essence, to construct value indexes 
for practices and larger organizations 
will be forthcoming in the foreseeable 
future.  
For more than a decade, multiple 
stakeholders have worked to create 
reliable and valid measures of care to 
be used in public reporting, provider 
profiling, and potentially in value-
based payment. The National Quality 
Forum is charged with endorsing 
national consensus standards for 
measuring and publicly reporting on 
performance. Its process attempts to 
validate candidate measures and 
instructs would-be users on their 
proper application. It has collected 
over 600 used (and useful) measures 
and continues to review and endorse 
more.
32
 Yet, in the view of many, 
even this large and growing number 
of measures is not likely to support a 
dramatic shift from volume-based 
payment to payment that directly 
rewards high value. Some barriers 
have been technical. Currently, 
measurement approaches must rely on 
existing data sources, which for the 
most part have been administrative 
claims rather than true clinical 
information, which would be 
facilitated by widespread adoption of 
health information technology, 
especially electronic health records.  
There are major gaps in the current 
quality measure sets as well as 
practical concerns about how 
measurement of quality is actually 
conducted, leading some quality-of-
care experts to conclude that the 
measurement of quality in health care 
is neither standardized nor 
consistently accurate and reliable. 
This in turn leads to the concern for 
some that despite the compelling logic 
of basing payment on measured 
performance, current publicly- 
reported quality measures might 
misinform the public and be misused 
by payers in making inferences about 
quality.
33
  
Some important clinical areas where 
measures are lacking include: 
 diagnostic errors (which are 
common and outnumber surgical 
errors as the leading cause of 
outpatient malpractice claims and 
settlements);
34
  
 risk-adjusted surgical success 
rates;
35
  
 appropriateness of diagnostic and 
therapeutic interventions;
36
 and  
 the ability to skillfully manage 
patients with varying 
combinations of multiple clinical 
and psychosocial problems. 
37
  
A Medicare Payment Advisory 
Commission (MedPAC) analysis 
documented that family physicians, 
general practitioners, and internists 
each treat nearly 400 different 
diagnostic categories comprising 
treatment episodes. For these three 
primary care specialties, between 63 
and 71 episode types make up 80 
percent of their total episodes.
38
 Yet, 
the current CMS program of pay-for-
reporting, called the Physician Quality 
Reporting Initiative, which the 
Affordable Care Act considers the 
forerunner to actual pay-for-
performance for physicians in 
Medicare, has selected three process 
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measures for each specialty on which 
to base a quality reporting initiative. 
Whatever such a limited snapshot of 
care is useful for, it does not provide a 
meaningful assessment of the quality, 
much less the value, of the care these 
clinicians provide. Assessing a few 
physician activities based on available 
measures—which represent a trivial 
component of the hundreds of 
decisions health professionals make 
every day—is akin to the drunk who 
lost his keys in the bushes but is 
looking for them under the lamppost 
because the light is so much better. In 
terms of providing physicians with a 
valid report card of their quality and 
cost—and then attaching financial 
rewards and penalties to that report 
card—there is a risk of falling into the 
trap identified by Steven Kerr in his 
classic management essay, ―On the 
folly of rewarding A, while hoping for 
B.‖39 
A Complication: 
Controversies in 
Measuring the Cost of Care  
Although most of the focus of 
performance measurement of value 
has focused on the quality numerator, 
recently there has been growing 
controversy about even whether costs 
(the denominator) can be measured 
accurately and put into any value 
index. 
The Dartmouth Atlas achieved broad 
policy and, more recently, political 
attention because its data show that 
Medicare costs vary significantly 
across the country with no apparent 
differences related to clinical quality 
or patient experiences with care.
40
 
This seminal research on geographic 
spending variations across the 
country, performed by Dartmouth 
researchers and published in peer-
reviewed journals, suggested that as 
much as 30 percent of Medicare 
spending was unnecessary to produce 
the same level quality of care.
41
  
While the fundamental Dartmouth 
findings that there are substantial, 
largely unexplained regional practice 
and spending variations have recently 
been confirmed, the magnitude and 
implication of the Dartmouth 
spending variation findings have only 
been recently scrutinized. Concerns 
have been raised about whether the 
Dartmouth Atlas findings properly 
account for individuals‘ underlying 
health status; the differences in input 
prices, such as wage rates in different 
regions; and varying spending for 
activities for explicit purposes other 
than direct health care delivery, 
including graduate medical education 
and subsidies to support 
disproportionate-share hospitals that 
serve as safety net hospitals.
42
 Further, 
recent analysis finds that the pattern 
of spending variations found in 
Medicare are not emulated in 
commercial insurance spending, 
largely because of the effect of 
negotiated prices for hospitals, 
physicians, and other providers, which 
vary geographically with a very 
different pattern compared with 
Medicare‘s administratively set 
prices.
43
  
Finally, policy research has pointed to 
an important difference between per 
capita spending across geographic 
areas and rates of increase in per 
capita spending; for example, some 
typical low Medicare-spending areas 
also have relatively high rates of 
growth in spending.
44
 For some policy 
purposes, the base spending variations 
would be the relevant consideration, 
but for ―bending the curve‖ of health 
spending, the rates of growth would 
seem to be more relevant. There is no 
clear-cut agreement on which 
metric—per capita spending or 
growth in per capita spending—
should be used in calculating a value 
index of an area‘s or provider‘s 
performance. Perhaps the 
commissioned IOM study will find 
such a consensus.  
If the cost of care is to be measured 
and used to determine value-based 
payments—presumably, based on a 
value index specific to medical 
practices, provider organizations, or 
geographic areas—these and other 
details will need to be resolved.  
All Payment Incentives 
Have Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
Jamie Robinson observed, ―There are 
many mechanisms for paying 
physicians; some are good and some 
are bad. The three worst are fee-for-
service, capitation, and salary.‖45 The 
basic goal of developing and testing 
alternative payment approaches, 
including those identified for study in 
the Affordable Care Act, is to move 
toward use of better—or less bad—
payment approaches. The Affordable 
Care Act explicitly calls for pilots to 
test payment models for medical 
homes (Sec. 3021, 2703, 5405), 
accountable care organizations (Sec. 
2706, 3022), bundled payments (Sec. 
3023, 2704), and global capitation 
(Sec. 2705).  
Miller and others have provided 
extensive reviews of how alternative 
payment approaches would work and 
have detailed the incentives inherent 
in each, as well as the practical, 
operational issues related to 
implementation.
46
 All payment 
approaches provide both desirable and 
undesirable incentives, and there is no 
guarantee that payment systems with a 
demonstrated relationship to desired 
outcomes will not have untoward 
effects as well. 
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Fee-for-Service 
Despite its deserved, checkered 
reputation for promoting care 
fragmentation and overspending, even 
beleaguered fee-for-service payment 
contains positive attributes currently 
overlooked in the zeal to move away 
from volume-based payment. Fee-for-
service rewards industriousness; it 
inherently adjusts payment to some 
extent for patient health status because 
sicker patients receive more 
attention—and more services—from 
providers. And fee-for-service permits 
targeting specific activities of interest; 
for example, specifically coding and 
then paying relatively generously for 
administering vaccinations generates 
more attention by physician practices 
to this aspect of preventive care than 
if the vaccinations were incorporated 
into a bundled payment. Indeed, given 
these positive attributes, some 
elements of fee-for-service might 
actually be included in new payment 
models. Nevertheless, at its core, fee-
for-service‘s ―more is better‖ set of 
incentives is no longer affordable.  
Medical Home Payments 
Some of the new payment approaches 
remain grounded in fee-for-service 
but with some variations that 
theoretically should produce higher 
―value.‖ For example, a common 
payment method being used in 
patient-centered medical home 
demonstrations is to provide an 
additional payment per member per 
month to cover the costs of a range of 
expected medical home activities in 
addition to standard fee-for-service 
payments, which mostly pay for face-
to-face, patient-physician office visits. 
Proponents of such a mixed payment 
model theorize that a mixed fee-for-
service and monthly medical home 
per capita payment could balance the 
undesirable fee-for-service, volume-
generating incentive with the 
undesirable capitation payment 
incentive to stint on care. In that way, 
mixing the incentives could produce 
both higher quality (by now 
financially supporting non-face-to-
face activities related to 
communicating with patients and 
coordinating care) and reduced health 
system costs (as the responsive 
medical home reduces the frequency 
of preventable emergency room visits 
and hospitalizations).  
But, of course, some physician 
practices might choose to respond to 
the incentives separately, continuing 
to generate a high volume of office 
visits, while stinting on the 
complementary medical home 
services. Performance measures 
would certainly help in this context to 
identify whether practices respond to 
the new incentives as hoped for. 
Higher value care would be produced 
only if they do.  
Bundled Payments 
The Affordable Care Act directs the 
HHS secretary to test bundled 
payments in both Medicare and 
Medicaid to provide incentives for 
providers to coordinate care and be 
jointly responsible for an entire 
episode of care, initially focused on 
episodes based around 
hospitalizations for particular 
conditions. In the Medicare 
demonstration, a single payment 
would be made to the hospital for all 
of the services for acute inpatient 
care; hospital outpatient care; post-
acute care provided by skilled nursing 
facilities, rehabilitation units, and 
home health agencies; and ambulatory 
care, including physician services. 
The bundled payment would cover an 
episode that includes three days prior 
to hospitalization through 30 days 
following discharge.  
In theory, because it provides a fixed 
payment for a period of time 
associated with hospitalizations, 
bundled payments provide strong 
financial incentives for providers to 
improve efficiency through enhanced 
coordination of care and reduction of 
services that do not improve care.
47
 
Because they would receive a fixed 
payment to cover the costs of the 
bundled episode of care, just as DRGs 
currently do for hospitals alone, the 
providers who participate in the 
bundled payment now would have 
internalized incentives to be efficient 
and reduce unneeded services, in 
contrast to basic fee-for-service 
incentives where reducing unneeded 
services benefits the payers. Indeed, 
the potential of bundled episode 
payment lies directly with the 
incentives provided for collaboration 
and efficiency—within the bundled 
episode.  
However, bundled episodes retain the 
volume-based incentive to generate 
lots of episodes.
48
 Indeed, a main 
cause of high spending in the United 
States has been diagnostic and 
therapeutic interventions, often for 
discretionary services for which there 
is a large ―gray zone‖ related to 
appropriateness. So bundled episodes 
may temper the current incentives to 
do unnecessary diagnostic tests within 
an episode but may actually increase 
the incentive to use diagnostic testing 
to find more treatable conditions 
eligible for large episode-based 
payments. The incentives to offer 
more procedures requiring a 
hospitalization may be enhanced if the 
alignment of hospitals and physicians 
generates efficient ―service line‖ 
operations, which might increase 
patient demand for services of 
marginal need as part of what has 
been called a ―medical arms race.‖49 
And as noted above, currently there 
are not good measures of the 
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appropriateness of procedural 
interventions. If they become 
available, such complementary 
measures would help ensure that the 
new incentives inherent in the bundled 
episode do not produce unwanted 
provider behavior. 
Conclusion 
There is consensus that health reform 
needs to adopt payment systems that 
better reward the value of the care 
provided, rather than merely the 
volume. What is uncertain is how to 
make that fundamental and ambitious 
change. Some believe that value will 
need to be measured directly through 
application of comprehensive 
performance metrics that permit a 
valid assessment of the many aspects 
of the quality and costs of care. At this 
time, however, for all the activity and 
progress in developing, testing, and 
implementing performance measures, 
we lack both the requisite measures 
and the operational ability to 
implement them to fairly evaluate 
quality and costs.  
Recognizing the large gaps in 
measures and concerns about 
measurement implementation, value-
based payment may be more easily 
achieved by altering payment 
incentives to promote behaviors that 
have a demonstrated relationship to 
desired outcomes, whether or not real-
time measurement can confirm the 
desired outcomes are achieved in 
particular cases. The main challenge 
with this approach is that incentives to 
promote desirable outcomes also have 
the potential to promote undesirable 
outcomes if misapplied. Here, 
performance measures specifically 
designed to identify the 
misapplication of incentives might 
play an important complementary 
role.  
The Affordable Care Act makes 
specific commitments to explore both 
broad approaches outlined in this 
paper, by specifying approaches that 
would further the idea of measure-
based performance assessment, while 
at the same time fostering pilots and 
demonstrations that rely mostly on 
altering payment incentives. Without 
question, further progress in filling the 
gaps in current measurement sets will 
advance both approaches.
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